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TORT LAW IN THE REGULATORY AGE
ALLAN KANNER *
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of public law regulations on private law liability is a re-
curring issue in environmental and toxic tort cases.1 Increasing num-
bers of American businesses and industries seek refuge from state tort
actions in the doctrine of federal preemption. These defendants urge
federal displacement of state tort remedies, hoping to avoid accounta-
bility for their actions, especially in the absence of congressional regu-
lation.2 Such a regulatory gap deprives citizens of the right to legal
recourse for injury.3
This use of preemption as an offensive weapon is especially signifi-
cant in environmental and toxic tort cases because of the potential
scope of its application. In light of a steadily expanding Commerce
* B.A. University of Pennsylvania (1975); J.D. Harvard Law School (1979). Mr.
Kanner has successfully prosecuted a variety of environmental, toxic tort, business tort,
civil RICO, and fiduciary duty cases on both class action and individual bases.
1. See Allan Kanner, Future Trends In Toxic Tort Litigation, 20 RUTGERs L.J. 667,
686-687 (1989) [hereinafter Future Trends].
2. A meaningful alternative may be procedural as well as substantive. For example,
the discovery rights afforded civil litigants are often not available in administrative pro-
ceedings, even though they may be outcome determinative. See Allan Kanner, The
Evolving Jurisprudence of Toxic Torts: The Prognosis for Corporations, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1265 (1991) [hereinafter Evolving Jurisprudence] (discussing the importance of
discovery in civil litigation).
3. Although the Supreme Court recognized Congress' preemptive authority as early
as 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), over one-half of the federal
statutes which have ever preempted state law were enacted after 1970. See W. John
Moore, Stopping the States, NAT'L J. July 21, 1990, at 1760. The demand by business
and industry for federal preemption is often an attempt to avoid state regulation that is
more stringent than federal requirements. Id.
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Clause power, Congress posses significant regulatory authority over the
national economy.4 Congress' increasing authority over the national
economy suggests that a growing number of traditional state causes of
action will fall within the domain of Congress and thus be subject to
preemption defenses.5 Some of the regulated areas currently subject to
preemption challenges are cigarettes,6 drugs,7 medical devices,' nuclear
4. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
5. A report by the Academy for State and Local Government found that, while the
federal role in intergovernmental relations has diminished as a result of deregulation
and reduced federal aid, state and local authority continues to be preempted. See
Martha M. Hamilton, Industries Try for Federal Regulation; Businesses Find Rules of
States are Tougher, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 29, 1987, at HI, H6. The result is a
regulatory vacuum. Cf Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum
Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (confronting the issue of whether federal preemption existed absent
express statutory language and a federal regulatory program).
6. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988). The
circuit courts that considered whether to permit tort recoveries against a cigarette man-
ufacturer for failure to warn of the hazards of cigarette smoking concluded that al-
lowing such a recovery conflicts with the delicate balance Congress sought to achieve
between public health and the national economy. See, eg., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing the Third Circuit's statement
that "[tihe Act 'represents a carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warning
the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the interests of the na-
tional economy' "); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that a suit under the Act which "disrupts excessively the balance of purpose set
by Congress" is preempted); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that claims for failure to warn of the hazards of smoking "tip" the Act's
balances of purpose and conflict with the Act), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). In
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989), the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempts any
tort claims based upon the duty to warn, but does not preempt tort actions for fraudu-
lent misrepresentations with respect to advertising. Id. at 660-62.
7. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988
& Supp. 111990). In Abbott by Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th
Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit held that the FDCA does not preempt defective design or
failure to warn claims arising out of vaccinations. Accord Hurley v. Lederle Lab. Div.
of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988).
8. Medical Devices Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No.
94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360e (1988)). In Moore v.
Kimberly Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit held that the
Medical Devices Amendment to the FDCA preempts failure to warn and labeling
claims for toxic shock syndrome; however, the amendment does not preempt negligent
design claims. Id. at 246-47. LaVetter v. International Playtex, 706 F. Supp. 722 (D.
Ariz. 1988) held the FDCA preempts all tort claims which would impose additional or
different requirements with respect to the safety or effectiveness of a medical device. Id.
at 723. Accord Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
In contrast, in Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989), the
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power,9 and pesticides.' °
The use of preemption as an offensive tactic is unlikely to succeed.
Overlapping public and private law is not novel. Until recently, such
dual regulation was not deemed problematic."1 Many of the federal
district court rejected the notion that the Medical Devices Amendment preempts state
tort claims. Id. at 667-68.
9. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988). In Silkwood v. Kerr-Mc-
Gee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the Atomic
Energy Act does not preempt punitive damage claims under state law. Id. at 626.
Moreover, the Court declined to preempt state tort law in the absence of a federal rem-
edy. Id. at 623. Silkwood is an important case dealing with federal preemption of state
tort liability. For courts to preempt state tort law, they must overcome the Courts'
holding in Silkwood.
10. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1988 & Supp. III 1991). In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Corp., 736 F.2d 1529
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984), the District of Columbia Circuit
Court held that FIFRA does not preempt state common law tort claims based on inade-
quate labeling. Id. at 1540-43. The court reasoned that even if a state may not require
a manufacturer to impose additional warning labels beyond those mandated by federal
law, a state may still require a manufacturer to pay damages to compensate those in-
jured. Id. at 1541. The district court in Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp.
404 (E.D. Mich. 1987), held that FIFRA preempted state tort claims for negligent la-
beling. Id. at 407-408. The district court rejected the Ferebee court's analysis and
adopted the reasoning of the "cigarette" cases instead. Id. at 407.
The 1991 Supreme Court case Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476
(1991), established that:
[e]ven when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, preemption may
occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict... [such as] when
"compliance with both... is a physical impossibility," or when a state law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress."
Id. at 2482.
The Court found that "mere silence" on the issue of preemption was insufficient to
establish that Congress intended to preempt state law. Id. at 2483. The Court con-
strued FIFRA to allow state regulation of use and sales of pesticides even where a
"narrow preemptive overlap" might occur. Id. at 2486. Simultaneous compliance with
both the local ordinance and FIFRA was not impossible. FIFRA never sought to es-
tablish a permanent affirmative permit scheme, notwithstanding its sweeping regulation
of registration, classification, certification, inspection, labelling, and possible banning of
pesticides. Id.
11. See Future Trends, supra note 1, at 687 n.124 (noting cases upholding state tort
claims despite federal regulations). In a recent case, Ciba-Geigy v. Alter, No. 91-235,
1992 WL 117164 (Ark. May 26, 1992), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
intent of Congress in enacting FIFRA, which imposed a duty to label, did not preempt
the State of Arkansas' state tort law claims against Ciba-Geigy for failure to adequately
label the herbicides it manufactured. Id. at 9. This ruling was based on the existence of
a savings clause in FIFRA section 136(v), which clearly states that states are allowed to
regulate the use of EPA approved pesticides. Id. at 8.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
278 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:275
regulatory statutes, including the environmental statutes, contain ex-
press savings clauses, which attempt to elucidate the balance between
state and federal statutory purview. 12
Federalism makes clear that federal regulations and state tort laws
must co-exist. It demands that courts foreclose state remedies only
upon clear and unambiguous evidence that Congress so intends. 13
Congress possesses the power to displace or preempt state law through
the Supremacy Clause. 4 "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone" in determining whether Congress has exercised this
power. 15
Nevertheless, it is uncommon for Congress to expressly preempt
state common law. Instead, Congress affords deference to state sover-
[W]e understand the desirability of uniformity in labeling hazardous products, and
we do not doubt that Congress intended to achieve uniform minimum labeling
standards by passing the Act. We cannot, however, conceive of a plan by Congress
to supplant the laws by which the states recompense, and to a degree protect, their
citizens and others from injury resulting from the use of those products. Congress
surely did not intend to put in place a system of uniformity in labeling so absolute
as to subvert the tort laws of the states.
Id. at 9.
12. See, ag., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)
(1988) ("Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this
subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law."); Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988)
("Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities."); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988) ("Nothing in this
section shall restrict any right which any person ... may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief.").
13. Preemption of state law may be affected by Congressional legislation. Under
such circumstances, "[a court's] sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress." Cali-
fornia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987). The requisite Con-
gressional intent may manifest itself in several forms.
14. The origins of the preemption doctrine are found in the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI of the United States Constitution which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. Nothing within the text of the Constitution itself mandates the
preemption of state tort law. Arguably, the text stands for preservation of state tort
law. E.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
15. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 284 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,
504 (1978)).
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eignty concerns and principles of federalism.16 Accordingly, it became
necessary for the Supreme Court to enunciate and consistently apply
guidelines for giving effect to the purpose of Congress. 7 At the same
time, due regard for healthy federalism led the Court to prescribe a
presumption against federal preemption of state law. A clear and un-
ambiguous statement of Congress' intent to preempt state law is dis-
positive.'" However, absent express preemption, state law is implicitly
preempted if it lies within a field Congress intended to occupy solely or
to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with the federal law. 9
For example, Congress implicitly preempts state law by enacting legis-
lation which occupies the entire field of regulation such that supple-
mentary state regulation is impossible2 ° or where the exercise of state
law conflicts with federal law.2 ' A state law conflicts with federal law
16. See, ag., Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-445 (1988) ("A state
may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to
railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule [covering the same
subject matter].").
17. The Court has consistently announced and applied these preemption principles:
I) state law is preempted when Congress has explicitly provided; 2) in the absence of
explicit statutory language, state law is preempted where it regulates conduct in a field
that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively; and 3) to the
extent it conflicts with Federal Law. See, eg., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72, 78-79 (1990) (employee's state law tort claim is not preempted by the Energy Reor-
ganization Act); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989) (state indirect
purchaser laws were not preempted by federal antitrust laws); California Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1986) (Title VII does not preempt the
California Fair Housing & Employment Act); Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Lab. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1984) (county health ordinance is not preempted
by Public Health Service Act).
18. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
19. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
20. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See also Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-204
(1983) ("Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state law
altogether may be found from a 'scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
it ... "'); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (same).
21. See, ag., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1987)
(holding that the Clean Water Act preempted Vermont law as applied to actions arising
from an out-of-state water source because application of Vermont law would enable the
parties to circumvent the Clean Water Act); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970
F.2d 1301, 1307 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act preempted state tort law providing for damages for failure to provide
adequate warning to consumers because state tort law was more elaborate than and
different from FIFRA); Title Ins. Co. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 963 F.2d 297, 301-02
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that state law which required the filing of a certificate of
1993]
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only where compliance with both state and federal law is physically
impossible22 or the state law obstructs the accomplishment of Con-
gress' purposes and objectives.23
The presumption against preemption is especially strong when Con-
gress legislates in an area traditionally occupied by the States. The
presumption is based primarily upon federalism concerns. The pre-
emption analysis begins from the assumption that Congress does not
intend to deprive the states of their traditional police powers absent a
clearly expressed purpose.25 The presumption against preemption is
stronger where Congress allegedly supplants traditional state tort rem-
edies without providing an alternative avenue for redress.26
Executive Order No. 12612 memorialized and expanded the pre-
sumption against preemption.27 President Reagan issued the Order on
October 26, 1987. The President sought to restore the division of
power between the national government and the states that Framers of
redemption no later than 75 days from the date of public foreclosure sale conflicted with
federal law permitting such filings at least 120 days from a public foreclosure sale and
thus were preempted).
22. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963).
23. International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (quoting Hills-
borough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
24. Legislation or administrative action affecting a subject matter "traditionally re-
garded as properly within the scope of state superintendence" carries a strong presump-
tion against preemption. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 144 (1963). A clear statement of congressional intent is required; preemption is not
to be found absent a clear and unambiguous Congressional mandate. Id. at 142. Cau-
tion in finding preemption is justified because if a court erroneously permits preemption
of a state law, the state is powerless to remedy the situation. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984). Congress has the ability to clearly state
its intentions to preempt. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
25. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. This presumption against preemption guarantees that the
federal-state balance will not be disturbed unnecessarily by the courts. Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
26. Absent a federal remedy, the presumption against preemption of state law reme-
dies, such as tort recoveries, is heightened. Abbot by Abbot v. American Cyanamid
Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
The Supreme Court recognized that Congress is highly unlikely to remove all means
of judicial recourse for those injured without providing an alternative federal remedy.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). The Supreme Court has
never found a negligence claim preempted by federal law where some form of alterna-
tive remedy does not exist. See, e.g., United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (noting that a finding of preemption would not only cut off
the injured party's right to recovery, but would also have the effect of granting the
tortfeasor immunity from liability).
27. 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
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the Constitution contemplated.2" Section 4 of Order 12612 directly ad-
dresses preemption through Executive or agency action. The Order
requires either an express statement that Congress intended to preempt
state law or other comparably dispositive evidence.29
Whenever a department or agency official determines that an admin-
istrative action might impinge upon state sovereignty, Section 6 of Or-
der 12612 requires the department or agency to prepare a Federalism
Assessment. ° The presence or absence of such Federalism Assessment
may evidence either an attempt by a department or agency to preempt
state law, or it may reflect the department's or agency's interpretation
of a federal statute.31
28. Id.
29. Id. Section 4 of Order 12612 directly addresses preemption through Executive
or agency action:
(a) Executive Departments and agencies shall construe,... [a] statute to pre-
empt State law only when the statute contains an express preemption provision, or
there is some other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the
Congress intended preemption of state law, or when the exercise of State authority
directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under Federal statute.
(b) Where a Federal statute does not preempt State law [as defined above], exec-
utive departments and agencies shall construe any authorization in the statute for
the issuance of regulations as authorizing preemption of state law by rulemaking
only when the statute expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive regulations, or
there is some other firm or palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the
Congress intended to delegate authority to issue regulations affecting state law.
(c) Any regulatory preemption of state law shall be restricted to the minimum
level necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute pursuant to which the regula-
tions are promulgated.
(d) As soon as an Executive department or agency foresees the possibility of a
conflict between State law and federally protected interests within its area of regu-
latory responsibility, the department or agency shall consult... with appropriate
officials and organizations representing the states in an effort to avoid such conflict.
(e) When an executive department or agency proposes to act through adjudica-
tion or rule-making to preempt State law, the department or agency shall provide
all affected states notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation in the
proceedings.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Id The contents of any Assessment must:
(I) Certify that a proposed policy has been evaluated in light of the principles,
criteria and requirements of the Order;
(2) Identify any policy provisions inconsistent with the Order;
(3) Identify the extent to which a policy would impose financial costs or burdens
upon states; and
(4) Identify the extent to which the policy would preempt state law or impinge
upon state sovereignty.
Id.
1993]
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Section 8 expressly states that the Order's sole objective is to im-
prove the internal management of the executive branch.32 The lan-
guage of this section precludes only an action to enforce compliance
with Executive Order 12612. Because administrative preemption turns
on departmental or agency intentions and interpretations, this section
does not impair the value of Order 12612 in any preemption analysis.
The effect of Order 12612 upon the judicial approach to preemption
is uncertain. However, when considered with current case law, the
provisions of Executive Order 12612 have a potentially large impact
upon administrative preemption.
For example, under City of New York v. Federal Communication
Commission,33 an agency may preempt state laws without express au-
thorization under a federal statute so long as the statute is not con-
strued as forbidding preemption.34 While the Supreme Court has
indicated that the judiciary will not place limits upon an agency's exer-
cise of preemption, Executive Order 12612 acts as a check from within
the executive branch.
If a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to whether it autho-
rizes the preemption of state law, courts defer to an administrative
interpretation. 35 Courts afford deference to administrative interpreta-
tions, assuming it is based upon a reasonable construction of the stat-
ute.36 Because Order 12612 demands narrow Executive branch
construction of federal law, so as to avoid preemption absent a clear
congressional intent, the effect will be to preserve state law.
In light of these clear and longstanding rules, it is surprising that the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 31
32. Id.
Section 8 of Order 12612 states: "This Order is intended only to improve the internal
management of the Executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party against the United States, its
agencies, its officers, or any person." Id.
33. 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
34. Id. at 64.
35. See, eg., Colorado Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1579
(10th Cir. 1991) (deferring to the Department of Transportation's determination that its
regulations overlapped with Colorado law).
36. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
37. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). In Cipollone, the Court held that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 92-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1969), which required warning labeling on all
cigarette packaging, did not preempt state law damages actions. Rather, the federal
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/10
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From a jurisprudential point of view, the merits of the Court's ultimate
decision in Cipollone adds little to the position advanced by the Court
in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.38 One explanation is that Cipollone
and other recent tort cases, such as those challenging the constitution-
ality of punitive damages in the commercial context,3 9 reflect the busi-
ness community's influence over the Supreme Court's docket."
Depriving injured plaintiffs access to jury awarded damages works to
the business community's advantage. Therefore, the business commu-
nity argues for preemption, thus placing the decision making process in
the hands of an administrative agency instead of a jury.41 Most of the
Court's opinions addressing the preemption doctrine begin with a litur-
gical recitation of the presumption against preemption and then disre-
gard it during the analysis.42 The result is that courts find that the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act superseded only positive enactments by state
and federal rulemaking bodies that attempted to create duplicate regulations:
Petitioner alleges two theories of fraudulent misrepresentation. First, petitioner
alleges that respondents, through their advertising, neutralized the effect of feder-
ally mandated warning labels. Such a claim is predicated on a state-law prohibi-
tion against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to
minimize the health hazards associated with smoking. Such a prohibition, how-
ever, is merely the converse of a state law requirement that warnings be included in
advertising and promotional materials. Section 5(b) of the 1969 Act preempts both
requirements and prohibitions; it therefore supersedes petitioner's first fraudulent
misrepresentation theory.
112 S. Ct. at 2623.
38. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
39. E.g. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); Browning-
Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
40. Evolving Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 1273. Primarily, the business commu-
nity exercises its influence over the federal bureaucracy to impact the Court's docket.
Id.
41. See, e.g., Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc., v. Western Pa. Teamsters and Employers
Pension Fund, 785 F. Supp. 536, 543-44 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding ERISA preempted
state law claims for breach of contract, trustees' fraudulent misrepresentation, trustees'
negligent performance of duties, and conspiracy to commit fraud against trustees);
Brown v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 1212, 1218-24 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(holding that the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations
Act preempted state law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent con-
veyance, intentional interference with contractual relations, and state law RICO
claims); Allor v. Amicon Corp., 631 F. Supp. 326, 331 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (holding the
Labor Management Relations Act preempted state law claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation).
42. See, eg., Greater Washington Bd. of Trade v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d
1317, 1320-25 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that "the exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presumed" but holding ERISA preempted state law requiring employers to
provide health benefits to employees if employer was already providing health benefits
1993]
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imposition of tort liability "conflicts" with federal regulatory schemes
and is therefore preempted. Although the Cipollone decision slows this
trend,43 the longer view must be toward the ever-shifting Supreme
Court majority.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Proceedings Below
Rose Cipollone and her husband filed a product liability action seek-
ing damages for injuries resulting from Rose's lifetime use of ciga-
rettes.' In her complaint, Rose Cipollone alleged that the defendants,
the manufacturers of the cigarettes Rose Cipollone smoked, 1) failed to
provide consumers with adequate information of the health risks asso-
ciated with smoking; 2) intentionally neutralized the effect of the con-
gressionally-mandated health warnings through advertising and public
relations campaigns; 3) knowingly misrepresented the health hazards
of smoking; and 4) ignored and withheld from the public medical and
scientific evidence of the dangers of smoking.45
As an affirmative defense, the defendants raised the Labeling Act's
preemption provision to all plaintiff's post-1965 (post-Labeling Act)
claims.4 Plaintiff moved to strike the preemption defense.47 The dis-
under different plan); Federal Express Corp. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 936 F.2d
1075, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the presumption against preemption, but holding
that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted state law regulating the terms of service
offered by air carriers); Professional Lawn Care Ass'n v. Milford, 909 F.2d 929, 932-34
(6th Cir. 1990) (noting the presumption against preemption but holding the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act preempted state law imposing notice re-
quirements on pesticide users); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823
(1 1th Cir. 1989) (noting the strong presumption against preemption but holding that the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act preempted state tort claims for strict
liability and negligence against automobile manufacturer).
43. For a discussion of the early impact of Cipollone on these defenses, see Andrew
Blum, Cipollone Said To Spur SettlemenC But Lawyers Disagree, NAT. L.J., p. 3, Au-
gust 24, 1992 (discussing Cipollone's impact on airbag and pesticide cases). See also
U.S. Supreme Court Asked to Review Decision by Tenth Circuit Finding Pre-emption by
FIFRA, Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 344 (August 19, 1992) (discussing effect of
Cipollone on preemption claims under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act).
44. 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984). After Rose's death in 1984, her husband filed
a third amended complaint to include a wrongful death claim. 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
Following the trial, Antonio Cipollone died and their son prosecuted the case. Id.
45. 593 F. Supp. at 1149.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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trict court ruled that the Act did not expressly or impliedly preempt
any of Mrs. Cipollone's claims.4" The district court certified its finding
of preemption for interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit agreed to hear the appeal.4 9
The court of appeals upheld the district court's conclusion that the
Labeling Act's preemption provision did not expressly preempt Mrs.
Cipollone's common law tort claims.5 0 The court of appeals found that
Congress had not "occupied the field" of smoking related health
hazards.5 1 The court concluded, however, that Mrs. Cipollone's state
law tort claims were preempted because they presented an "actual con-
flict" with the Act. The court held that Mrs. Cipollone's common law
tort claims frustrated the purpose of the Act. On remand, the trial
court interpreted the court of appeals' decision as barring Mrs. Cipol-
lone's post-1965 claims for failure to warn, fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, express warranty, and conspiracy to defraud.52
Following a four-month trial, the jury returned a verdict of $400,000
on Mrs. Cipollone's pre-1966 express warranty claim against Liggett
Group, the manufacturer of the cigarettes she smoked during that pe-
riod.5 3 The jury also concluded that Liggett had a duty to warn of the
hazards of smoking prior to 1966; Liggett breached that duty; that
breach proximately caused Rose Cipollone's lung cancer and death.
4
Nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict in Liggett's favor on the fail-
ure to warn claim because of its findings on comparative fault.
55
Both parties appealed. The court of appeals reversed in part,56 af-
48. Id. at 1170.
49. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 185.
51. Id. at 187. The court stated that the Act preempted all claims pertaining to
smoking and health that challenge the adequacy of the warning label or the propriety of
a party's action with respect to advertising and promotion as well as claims pertaining
to a negligent failure to warn. Id. By negative implication, the court held that claims
outside these areas are not preempted by the Act.
52. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 672-75 (D.N.J. 1986).
53. 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988).
54. Id.
55. Id. The jury found that Mrs. Cipollone voluntarily encountered a known dan-
ger, which proximately caused her cancer. Id. The jury attributed 80% of the fault to
Mrs. Cipollone thus barring her failure to warn claim. Id.
56. The Court reversed the district court's order, which barred the Cipollones' risk
utility claim. The appellate court also reversed the lower court's judgment on the fail-
ure to warn claim, express warranty claim, and the motion for summary judgment.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir. 1990).
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firmed in part,57 and remanded for a new trial.5 8 The court recognized
the problems created by its interlocutory preemption decision. The
court's finding of preemption created an artificial time constraint on
the determination of both causation and liability.59 It concluded that
the skewed effect of its ruling warranted a reversal of the jury's com-
parative fault finding." Despite these observations, the court reaf-
firmed its prior interlocutory preemption decision, affirming the district
court's interpretation that the court of appeals decision barred the Ci-
pollones' claims for failure to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, ex-
press warranty, and conspiracy to defraud.6
The court also held that the preemption bar applied to Mrs. Cipol-
lone's intentional tort claims.62 The court reasoned that such claims
challenged the defendants' advertising and promotional activities with
respect to cigarettes, in conflict with the earlier preemption opinion.63
In its earlier decision, however, the court of appeals noted the absence
of definitive evidence that Congress intended to preempt state tort
lawA4
57. The court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the Cipollones' post-
1965 failure to warn, express warranty, and intentional tort claims. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 546. The court of appeals noted that its holding caused the district court
to forbid the jury from considering the effect of the cigarette manufacturer's post-1965
conduct. The jury could only consider whether the pre-1965 breach of warranty and
failure to warn proximately caused Mrs. Cipollone's death. Id. The court allowed the
jury to consider Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 smoking, believing it relevant to a determi-
nation of comparative fault. Id.
60. 893 F.2d at 547. The court noted that "permitting [Liggett Group, Inc.] to take
advantage of Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 conduct to escape liability altogether, particu-
larly in the face of [the Cipollones'] allegations that [Liggett Group, Inc.] engaged in
post-1965 conduct designed to reassure smokers, creates an unacceptable imbalance."
Id.
61. Id. at 582.
62. Id. On appeal, Mr. Cipollone argued that the district court erred in holding
that the court of appeals preemption holding barred all of the Cipollones' intentional
tort claims. Id. The court of appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the Cipol-
lones' based their claim on the manufacturer's advertising conduct, and therefore, was
in the realm of actions barred by preemption. Id.
63. Id.
64. 789 F.2d 185-86. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals conclusion:
The Senate Report emphasized that the "pre-emption of regulation or prohibition
with respect to cigarette advertising is narrowly phrased to preempt only state ac-
tion based on smoking and health. It would in no way affect the power of any State
... with respect to the taxation or the sale of cigarettes to minors, or the prohibi-
tion of smoking in public buildings or similar police regulations."
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Chief Judge Gibbons joined in the preemption portion of the opinion
because he felt bound by the prior panel's decision.65 In a concurring
opinion, he concluded that, as a matter of law, the court's original pre-
emption decision was wrong.66
B. Statute Involved
As enacted by Congress, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act of 196567 required cigarette manufacturers to place the fol-
lowing warning on cigarette packages beginning on January 1, 1966:
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to Your Health.,
61
In 1970, Congress amended the warning to read: "Warning, The Sur-
geon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous
112 S. Ct. at 2624 n.26 (quoting S. Rep. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 12 (1969)).
The Supreme Court further noted:
[T]his reading of "based on smoking and health" is wholly consistent with the
purposes of the 1969 Act. State law prohibitions on false statements of material
fact do not create "diverse, nonuniform and confusing" standards. Unlike state
law obligations concerning the warning necessary to render a product "reasonably
safe," state law proscriptions on intentional fraud rely only on a single, uniform
standard: falsity. Thus, we conclude that the phrase "based on smoking and
health" fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty
not to make fraudulent statements. Accordingly, petitioners' claim based on alleg-
edly fraudulent statements made in respondents' advertising are not preempted by
section 5(b) of the 1969 Act.
Id. at 2624.
The court of appeals held that the lower court correctly found that § 1334 of the Act
did not expressly preempt state tort law. 789 F.2d at 185. Nor did Congress clearly
intend to occupy the field so as to preclude all state tort actions. Id. at 186. Every
court that has considered this issue has reached the identical conclusion. See, e.g., Pen-
nington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that the preemption
provision of the Act makes no reference to any state tort claims, directly or indirectly;
therefore, the Act did not expressly preempt plaintiff's products liability claims); Roys-
don v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that
§ 1334 does not expressly preempt state law claims nor is there evidence of Congres-
sional intent to displace state common law claims); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658-661 (Minn. 1989) (noting that state law claims are not ex-
pressly preempted nor impliedly preempted absent actual conflict with the Act); Dewey
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1247 (N.J. 1990) (agreeing with other
courts which held that the Act neither expressly preempts state common-law claims nor
impliedly preempts them by pervasively occupying the field of law).
65. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 583 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
66. Id. Chief Judge Gibbons believed the court's prior interlocutory ruling lacked a
factual basis. Id.
67. Pub. L. No. 89-92,79 Stat. 282, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1988)) [hereinafter Labeling Act].
68. § 4, 79 Stat. at 283.
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to Your Health.",6
9
The Labeling Act's preamble sets forth the Act's policy and pur-
pose."° The original Act contained an express preemption clause,
which required only that a specific warning phrase appear on every
pack of cigarettes sold.71 That preemption provision was amended in
1970 to clarify the Act's preemptive authority.7 2 However, the Act
69. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat.
87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1339 (1988)). Congress changed the warn-
ing requirement in 1984 by enacting the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (codified at §§ 1331, 1333, 1335-1341 (1988)), but those
requirements were not implicated because Rose Cipollone's lung cancer was diagnosed
in 1981.
70. § 2, 79 Stat. at 282. These provisions were not changed by the 1970 amendment
to this Act. The Labeling Act's preamble sets forth the following statement of policy
and purpose:
DECLARATION OF POLICY
§ 2. It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpese of this Act, to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising
with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby-
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be haz-
ardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of ciga-
rettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, non-
uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect
to any relationship between smoking and health.
Id.
71. § 5, 79 Stat. at 283. The original Labeling Act included the following preemp-
tion section:
Section 5. (a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the state-
ment required by § 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the adver-
tising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this Act.
Id.
The preemption section also required the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to
submit periodic reports to Congress on the effectiveness of cigarette labeling, advertis-
ing, and promotion. § 5(d)(2), 79 Stat. at 283. It required the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to transmit periodic reports to Congress on the health conse-
quences of smoking and the need for legislation. § 5, 79 Stat. at 283. The section recog-
nized that the Act failed to limit the FTC's authority with respect to unfair practices in
cigarette advertising. § 5(c), 79 Stat. at 283. The preemption section did not affirm nor
deny the FTC's holding that it was authorized to require an affirmative statement in
cigarette advertising. Id.
72. The preemption provision was amended as follows: Sec. 5(b) No requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect
to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
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lacks specific provisions addressing state law tort claims, and it pro-
vides no compensation scheme for individuals injured by smoking.
The Act prohibits imposition of advertising requirements "under
state law," thus precluding the imposition of state statutory or regula-
tory requirements.7" If Congress wanted to bar common law tort ac-
tions as well, it could have done so explicitly, as it has in other
statutes.74 Moreover, the Labeling Act's legislative history supports
the notion that Congress anticipated the continuation of product liabil-
ity suits against cigarette manufacturers under the Act.
Congress' silence with respect to preemption made it appropriate for
the lower court to search for signs of implied intent. In the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, however, Congress was not silent. It
included a section specifically entitled Preemption which failed to in-
lude state tort actions;75 therefore, it was unnecessary to infer an im-
plied intent to preempt these claims.76
The decision to confer immunity upon an entire industry from liabil-
ity for damages caused by the product it produces is a policy decision
for Congress, not the courts. Cigarette-related illnesses and deaths im-
pose significant costs on society in the form of medical expenses and
lost productivity," yet courts shield the cigarette industry from the
conformity with the provisions of this Act. § 5(b), 84 Stat. at 88 (subsection 5(a) of the
1965 Act remained unchanged).
73. § 5(b), 84 Stat. at 88.
74. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1988) ("[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chap-
ter shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title.").
75. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1987)
(holding "there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws"); see also
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 591-92 (1987) (stating
that clear statements in the "Purpose" section of the Senate Report on the Coastal Zone
Management Act clearly indicate congressional intent regarding preemption and, thus,
"end [the court's] inquiry"); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691,
696 (Minn. App. 1988) ("It is one thing for courts to try to divine congressional intent
from the overall operation of a statute and its legislative history when Congress has
been silent, but it is quite another to do so when Congress has included specific provi-
sions, as it did in 15 U.S.C. § 1334, expressly addressing what it intended to preempt.")
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
76. § 5, 79 Stat. at 283.
77. See generally Leila B. Boulton, Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments
in Judicial Responses to Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATHOLIC U. L. Rnv. 643, 645
n.11 (1987) (discussing estimates on medical care costs and loss of productivity costs
attributable to cigarette smoking).
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responsibility for these damages. No other industry, regardless of its
financial security, enjoys a comparable immunity. Some commentators
suggest that courts are compelled to find preemption in cigarette cases
in order to protect the tobacco industry from a flood of claims.7" How-
ever, the tobacco industry is not in need of such indulgence. Since the
mid-1950s, the industry has not lost a trial or paid a settlement in re-
sponse to a smoking-related tort claim.7 9  Cigarette manufacturers
compiled this unique record without the benefit of federal preemp-
tion.8 o Rather, the manufacturers prevail because the plaintiffs fail to
satisfy the burden of proof relative to causation.8" It should be imme-
diately apparent that, even without the protective shield conferred
upon cigarette manufacturers by the Third Circuit, few smokers could
be confident of prevailing in a product liability action.82
C. Issues Before The Supreme Court
All the tools needed to properly resolve the preemption issue in Ci-
78. See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Pol-
icy, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 903 (1988)
("some courts may have used the preemption doctrine to mask their misgivings about
the ability of tort litigation to provide fair compensation to injured consumers without
bankrupting the tobacco industry."); Brendan K. Collins, Case Review, 32 VILL. L.
REV. 875, 891 (1987) ("unless claims like those of the Cipollones [are] preempted, the
industry would be overcome by a tidal wave of lawsuits").
79. Donald W. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Propo-
sal, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1423, 1423 (1980).
80. Id. at 1425. 'These victories have been the result of both favorable legal rulings
and tenacious defense work." Id.
81. Id at 1425-28. See also William Kepko, Comment, Products Liability: Can It
Kick the Smoking Habit? 19 AKRON L. REV. 269 (1985) (discussing the history of
cigarette liability actions in which cigarette manufacturers consistently prevail).
82. If a significant number of claims for smoking-related injuries succeeded, Con-
gress could protect the industry by establishing a compensation scheme funded by ciga-
rette taxes. An industry compensation fund has been advanced unsuccessfully in the
past. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Compensation For Smoking-Related Injuries: An
Alternative to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1990); Garner, supra
note 79, at 1464 (discussing the merits of imposing a "safety tax" based on the compara-
tive levels of danger between various brands of cigarettes). The tobacco industry, which
carries considerable clout in congressional corridors, can be counted on to ensure that
the industry remains a viable market competitor. It was unnecessary for the Third
Circuit to cast a protective shield over the cigarette manufacturers. The Third Circuit
should have heeded the Supreme Court's advice: "The courts should not assume the
role which our system assigned to Congress." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 223 (1983).
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pollone previously appeared in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 83 How-
ever, the Third Circuit followed a new course. The Third Circuit
concluded that permitting state law tort claims obstructed the accom-
plishment and execution of Congress' objectives, as represented in the
Labeling Act.84 According to Professor Lawrence Tribe, the court
abandoned established principles of federalism and jeopardized the
rights that states afford their citizens. 5 It became necessary for the
Supreme Court to correct the appellate court's error.
Protecting consumers from hazardous products and affording fair
compensation to those who are injured by such products represent
strong state interests. 86 These interests are acknowledged as reasons
83. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
84. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
The language from Hines arguably permits a court to substitute its own policy judg-
ments for those of Congress. For this reason, commentators urge its abandonment. See
Robert C. Carlsen, Comment, Common Law Claims Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette
Warnings Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1986:
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 754, 767 (1986).
This interpretation of Hines is not mandatory. The context in which Justice Black
announced this rule indicates that it was clearly intended to apply in areas of particu-
larly federal concern. At issue was the validity of an Alien Registration Act adopted by
the state of Pennsylvania:
Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this
particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. And in that determi-
nation, it is of importance that this legislation is in a field that affects international
relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most gener-
ally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority. Any concurrent
state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits; the state's power
here is not bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax. And it is also of
importance that this legislation deals with the rights, liberties and personal free-
doms of human beings, and is in an entirely different category from state tax stat-
utes or state pure food laws regulating the labels on cans.
312 U.S. at 67-68. This distinction was underscored recently in Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985), which involved the issue of pre-
emption of local regulation of blood plasma. Justice Marshall noted that Hines inferred
a congressional intent to preempt state law based on a dominant federal interest in
foreign affairs. Id. at 719. "Needless to say, those factors are absent here. Rather, as
we have stated, the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and historically,
a matter of local concern." Id.
85. Laurence H. Tribe, Federalism with Smoke and Mirrors: Anti-cigarette Suits,
THE NATION, June 7, 1986, at 788.
86. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1249-50 (N.J.
1990) (noting that a state has a strong public policy interest in providing compensation
to those injured by defective products); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 391
(N.J. 1984) (same); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983) (same);
Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1981) (discussing the need
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for imposing liability for injuries resulting from products which prove
to be dangerous.8 7 Nevertheless, the defendants in Cipollone claimed
that Congress displaced state law and deprived injured victims of their
right to seek just compensation with respect to injuries resulting from a
single product."8
D. The Supreme Court Strengthens the Presumption
Against Preemption
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, In ,89 the Supreme Court stated that
because of the presumption against preemption, the Act must be nar-
rowly construed, and each common law claim must be examined to
determine whether it is expressly preempted.' The preemption lan-
guage must be given a "fair but narrow" reading.91 The Court found
that the petitioner's claim, alleging a conspiracy by respondents to mis-
represent or conceal facts concerning the health hazards of smoking,
was not preempted. The predicate duty not to conspire to commit
fraud is not a prohibition "based on smoking and health" addressed by
Section 5(b) of the Act, which refers to the wording required as health
warnings on cigarette labels.92 The Court concluded that the federal
statute only preempted state and federal rulemaking authorities from
mandating particular cautionary statements regarding cigarette smok-
ing and did not preempt state law tort actions. 93
for strict liability in defective design cases because of the importance of user protection
and the need for uniformity and consistency in products liability cases).
87. See generally Roger I. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965) (discussing the history and develop-
ment of strict liability based on the need to compensate victims of defective products);
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973) (same).
88. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
89. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
90. Id. at 2621.
91. Id. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text for the preemption language
of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
92. 112 S. Ct. at 2624. Section 1333(a) of the Act references the specific wording
required in the warning labels affixed to cigarette packaging. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)
(1988).
93. 112 S. Ct. at 2619. Because the statute included a broader preemption provision
than the original Act, barring not only "statements" on smoking and health but also
"requirements" and "prohibitions" relating to cigarettes, the Court found the scope of
the pre-emption clause was changed by the inclusion of this language, even though the
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Justice Blackmun, who concurred in part and dissented in part, em-
phasized the presumption against preemption of state law tort claims.
He concluded that Congress never intended to displace state common-
law tort actions like the claims presented by Mrs. Cipollone.94 Pre-
emption undermines the natural ability of the states to regulate the
health and safety of its citizenry. The effect of the Court's reinforce-
ment of the presumption against preemption is already affecting the
course of state law litigation.95
III. PREEMPTION LAW
A. There Is a Strong Presumption Against Preemption of
State Tort Remedies
Fundamental to the preemption doctrine is the assumption that
Congress does not intend to displace all state tort law. 96 This pre-
sumption against preemption is more than a statutory construction
tool. The presumption is rooted in the basic principles of federalism
which are embodied in the Constitution.97 Healthy federalism requires
a presumption that Congress did not intend to preclude all state law in
areas traditionally occupied by the states.
When Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the
states, the courts assume that the state's police powers are safe from
preemption by a Federal Act, provided Congress has not specifically
legislated to the contrary.98 The Supreme Court consistently reaffirms
legislative history of the revisions suggested the later act was merely a "clarification" of
the earlier act. Id.
94. Id. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
95. See Andrew Blum, Cipollone Said to Spur Settlement; But Lawyers Disagree,
NAT'L L.J., August 24, 1992, at 3. The Ford Motor Company, subsequent to the Cipol-
lone decision, settled an airbag personal injury suit for $350,000 in Thomas v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 8:91-2630-21, 2631-21 (E.D.S.C. 1991). Plaintiffs' attorneys noted set-
tlement talks picked up after the Cipollone ruling which was, at the time, before the
Fourth Circuit on a writ of mandamus. Blum, supra.
96. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); see also Milwaukee v. Ilinois,
451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (" '[Wie start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded ... unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.' ").
97. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). See also
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (noting that the presumption
against preemption "provides assurance that the 'federal-state balance' will not be dis-
turbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts").
98. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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this presumption in favor of state law.99
The Court established an even stronger presumption against federal
preemption in the absence of any alternative federal remedy. In Mar-
bury v. Madison,"c° Chief Justice Marshall stated that the government
must insure that the law affords every injured individual the protection
of the law.1 Based on recognition of this basic notion, the Court re-
fuses to find preemption of state law remedies where federal law pro-
vides no alternative redress."02 In Silkwood, the Court concluded that
Congressional silence assumes additional significance when Congress
fails to provide a remedy for persons injured from the use of a con-
sumer product, because Congress is unlikely to remove all means of
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct. 3 Justice Black-
mun, dissenting in Silkwood, was equally emphatic on this point."°
99. See, eg., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 410 (1990) (noting the pre-
sumption that "Congress does not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regula-
tion"); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 73 (1990) (holding that there was "no
'clear and manifest' intent on the part of Congress, in enacting § 210 [of the Energy
Reorganization Act] to preempt all state tort laws that traditionally have been available
to those persons who, like petitioners, allege outrageous conduct at the hands of an
employer"); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1988) (distin-
guishing the facts before the Court in Schneidewind and those in Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor where the field of regulation was one which "the states had traditionally occupied");
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963) (noting
that the regulation of avocados is one traditionally considered within the states' author-
ity, and therefore, an "unlikely candidate for exclusive federal regulation").
100. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
101. Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[the very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection."
Id. at 163.
102. See United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64
(1954).
103. In Silkwood the Court stated: "This silence [of Congress] takes on added sig-
nificance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured
by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, re-
move all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1983).
104. Justice Blackmun stated that "[tihe absence of federal regulation governing the
compensation of victims... is strong evidence that Congress intended the matter to be
left to the States." 464 U.S. at 263-64 n.7. Other courts have followed this theory. See,
e.g., Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The
presumption.., is even stronger against preemption of state remedies, like tort recov-
eries, when no federal remedies exist.").
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B. State Tort Remedies Are Not Consistent With
Federal Regulations
In Silkwood, the Court held that federal law preempted state regula-
tion of atomic power, but permitted jury awards for damages due to
plutonium contamination.10 5 The Court found that the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission possessed exclusive regulatory authority over safety
issues related to nuclear development, while state law governed the
compensation of individuals injured by nuclear hazards.10 6
Moreover, both dissenting opinions in Silkwood agreed with the ma-
jority that compensatory damages are consistent with federal regula-
tion.107 Justice Blackmun differentiated between the objectives of
punitive and compensatory damages and determined that compensa-
tory damages serve to compensate victims for their injuries.' 08 Justice
Blackmun concluded that such an award of compensatory damages
was consistent with federal regulation of a given area of law because it
is not regulatory in nature. Similarly, Justice Powell concluded that an
award of compensatory damages is not regulatory, especially where
state law explicitly provides such compensation.'
°9
Courts conclude that compelling a corporate defendant to pay com-
105. 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984). See also English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
85 (1990) ("This result is strongly suggested by the decision in Silkwood."); Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988) (holding that "Congress may reason-
ably determine that incidental regulatory pressure is acceptable, whereas direct regula-
tory authority is not" based on the Court's holding in Silkwood).
106. The Court stated that "Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent to vest
the NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over the safety aspects of nuclear develop-
ment while at the same time allowing plaintiffs like Mr. Silkwood to recover for injuries
caused by nuclear hazards." 464 U.S. at 258.
107. See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
108. Justice Blackmun stated that "the purpose of punitive damages is to regulate
safety, whereas the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate victims." 464
U.S. at 263.
109. Justice Powell's view was that "[tihere is no element of regulation when com-
pensatory damages are awarded, especially when liability is imposed without fault, as
authorized by state law." Id. at 276 n.3. The Court reaffirmed this distinction in Eng-
lish v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990):
[For a state law to fall within the preempted zone, it must have some direct and
substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear
facilities concerning radiological safety levels. We recognize that the claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress at issue here may have some effect on these
decisions, because liability for claims like petitioner's will attach additional conse-
quences to retaliatory conduct by employers. As employers find retaliation more
costly, they will be forced to deal with complaints by whistleblowers by other
means, including altering radiological safety policies. Nevertheless, we believe that
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pensatory damages does not impair a federal statutory scheme.11°
While "tension" may exist between tort liability and federal regula-
tions, the threat of paying damages does not frustrate a federal reme-
dial scheme of imposing civil fines on violators of federal standards."1
State law tort verdicts do not mandate any specific action from a de-
fendant. Rather the defendant is merely required to answer in dam-
ages. These state law tort verdicts provide defendants with merely the
option to change their behavior.' 1 2
The Supreme Court recognized that common law tort liability exerts
a "regulatory" impact which conflicts with federal schemes.113 How-
this effect is neither direct nor substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the
preempted field.
Id. at 85.
110. See, eg., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Corp., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (holding compliance with both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act was not impossible since Chevron could still use an EPA-approved label and
pay damages to successful tort plaintiffs), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1985); Montana
Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Mont. 1991) (follow-
ing the reasoning in Ferebee and concluding FIFRA did not preempt state law tort
recovery on failure to warn theory); Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500,
1506-08 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that it is not impossible to comply with FIFRA and
pay damages on state tort law claims).
111. See, eg., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984) ("Paying both
federal fines and state imposed punitive damages for the same incident would not ap-
pear to be physically impossible.").
112. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Corp., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("The verdict itself does not command Chevron to alter its label."), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984). Indeed, compliance with a legislative enactment or an adminis-
trative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable person
would take additional precautions. See, e.g., Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326
(9th Cir. 1979) ("A person is not necessarily free from negligence just because he 'may
have complied with safety statutes or rules. The circumstances may require him to do
more.' ").
113. See Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick& Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318-
19 (1981) (shipper brought state court action against railroad for failure to provide
adequate rail service); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243
(1959) (employer brought state court action against unions to enjoin picketing and col-
lect damages). In Garmon, the Court said, "[s]uch regulation can be as effectively ex-
erted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.
Garmon sought to replace state tort remedies with the remedial scheme provided by
the National Labor Relations Board "by ensuring that primary responsibility for inter-
preting and applying this body of labor law remains with the NLRB... based on the
primary jurisdiction rationale." Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 502 (1984). As one district court concluded, Gar-
mon deals with the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and its remedial scheme. Wood
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ever, cases such as San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon114
and Chicago & North Western Transportation Company v. Kalo Brick &
Tile Co. 115 are distinguishable because they involved business torts
arising out of actions permissible under federal law and for which relief
could be granted by administrative agencies. Neither case involves
preempting a common law negligence action for personal injuries. In-
flexible application of the Garmon doctrine must be avoided,116 partic-
ularly where the states have a substantial interest in regulating the
conduct at issue, and this interest does not interfere with the federal
regulatory scheme."1 7 When Congress displaces state law, preemption
is not an automatic defense merely because the federal statute intrudes
into the range of subjects traditionally left for state police powers.' 18
This is particularly true when Congress' desire for national uniformity
in a regulatory scheme takes precedence over the state police power
interest." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Cipollone decision strengthened the presumption against pre-
emption. The Court signaled that regulatory legislation will not be in-
v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1117-18 n.14 (D. Mass. 1987), rev'd, 865
F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988).
114. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
115. 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
116. Certain areas of law such as labor relations, immigration, and foreign policy
are deemed to fall within the federal sphere of superintendence. Therefore, the pre-
sumption against preemption is eased, assuming it even exists at all. See San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941). However, even the presence of a uniquely federal subject
matter does not preempt all state laws which might affect it. Further exceptions to
preemption under Garmon arise when the conduct involved is a "mere peripheral con-
cern of a federal labor law or statute or an issue involving deeply rooted state concerns.
117. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. Local Union No. 6, 493
U.S. 67 (1989). Some lower courts have rejected the notion that a defendant can com-
ply with federal regulations and still pay tort damages. Such courts disparage the
"choice of reaction" analysis as "akin to coming up for air after being underwater" and
hold that permitting the award of tort damages in personal injury cases would have a
"regulatory effect" which would frustrate congressional efforts to regulate a particular
field. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d 620, 627 (Ist Cir. 1987). See also Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 410-12 (Ist Cir. 1988) (discussing how state de-
sign standards can frustrate the implementation of federal performance standards under
the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Act).
118. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
119. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991).
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terpreted in an over-reaching fashion to protect the interests of
business against common law tort grievances. Cipollone relieves courts
of the uncertainty resulting from the creative interpretation of federal
statutes absent express preemption. The decision restricts the ability of
the business community to influence which areas are provided federal
protection by opening up possibilities for state common law challenges.
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